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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

Case No. 950380-CA

:
Priority No. 2

DAX BRANT HAMMER,

:
Oral Argument Not Requested

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant-appellant Dax Brant Hammer appeals one of the conditions in his
probation agreement, entered in lieu of a prison sentence upon his conviction for attempted
burglary, a third degree felony under Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-4-101, 76-4-102, 76-6-202 (1995).
This Court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
and
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Although framed differently by appellant Hammer, the State respectfully
submits that this case presents two issues:
1. Did Hammer waive his appellate challenge to a probation condition calling
for random, suspicionless searches of his person, property, and residence, by failing to object
to the legality of that condition when his criminal sentence was imposed? The question of
trial-level waiver is necessarily examined by the appellate court de novo upon the record, as is

the question whether the appellant has established any exception to the rule that issues not
raised in the trial court are waived on appeal. State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah
1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 & nn. 2-10 (Utah App. 1991).
Only if Hammer prevails on the above issue may this Court reach the
substantive issue on appeal:
2. Can a probation agreement, entered in lieu of incarceration for a felony
conviction, include a term requiring the defendant to permit suspicionless searches of his or
her person, residence, and property? Just as a trial court has wide discretion to grant or deny
probation, e.g., State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990), State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d
1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991), the crafting of a probation order to include certain conditions
must similarly allow wide trial court discretion. The question whether that discretion includes
authority to waive or restrict the defendant's Fourth Amendment protections is properly cast as
a matter of law, upon which no deference is due to the trial court.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Hammer has disclaimed any independent analysis under article I, section 14 of
the Utah Constitution. His argument on appeal thus involves only the similarly-worded Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Hammer was originally charged with second degree felony burglary, and
misdemeanor theft. By plea bargain, he pleaded guilty to a single count of attempted burglary
(dwelling), a third degree felony (R. 2, 12-15). The ensuing presentence report recommended
that Hammer be placed on probation, including a condition that he "submit to random
urinalysis and other tests of breath and bodily fluids to insure compliance with the terms and
conditions of Probation Agreement" (R. 51 at

(sealed presentence report, not released

with record on appeal)).
Hammer's standard Probation Agreement included the usual provisions for
breath and bodily fluid tests, and for "reasonable suspicion"-based searches of "PERSON,
RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property under my control, without a warrant, at any
time, day or night . . . " (R. 38, para. 6, copied in appendix I of this brief). The trial court,
however, added "SPECIAL CONDITIONS" to the Probation Agreement, which Hammer
signed: "D. Submit to random tests of breath or bodily fluids, and random searches of person
and property" (id.; see also R. 43, also copied in appendix I ("shall submit to a search of his
person, possessions, and residence upon request. . .")). Those amendments omitted any
"reasonable suspicion" requirement; the trial court so informed Hammer at sentencing: "You
will submit to random urinalysis and other testing of your breath and bodily fluids. And
you'll submit to a search of your person, your premises or any property under your control or
any vehicle under your control to determine whether or not you are using or possessing
controlled substances or alcohol" (R. 59-60, also copied in appendix I). On appeal, Hammer
challenges the inclusion of suspicionless searches as a condition of his probation.
3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A review of the facts, including events subsequent to the challenged sentence,
lends support to the State's position in this case. It appears from the transcript of Hammer's
29 March 1995 sentencing hearing (R. 54-63, copied in appendix I of this brief) that the trial
court and the parties agreed that Hammer has a substance abuse problem that had apparently
precipitated his crime (R. 56-58). Evidently impressed by Hammer's intelligence and
"heritage," the court expressed its desire to assure that Hammer would not again go astray (R.
58-59). Toward that end, the court imposed the special probation search condition, allowing
suspicionless searches, of which Hammer now complains.
On 18 April 1995, just eight days after he signed the Probation Agreement,
Hammer was a guest in a friend's home that was the subject of a warrant-supported search.
The warrant directed officers to search all persons present at the subject residence, and the
search of Hammer revealed a controlled substance and paraphernalia. In his ensuing
prosecution for possession of that contraband, before the same judge who had entered
Hammer's probation order in this case, Hammer moved to suppress, challenging the warrant's
validity. See State v. Hammer ("Hammer IF), Pet. for Interlocutory Review, No. 950437CA, filed in Utah Ct. App. 27 June 1995, at 1-3 (copied in appendix II of this brief).
Although concerned about the warrant, the trial court denied Hammer's motion to suppress,
relying upon the Probation Agreement to support the search of Hammer. However, the trial
court characterized the Probation Agreement as only authorizing searches based upon
"reasonable suspicion," and held that standard had been satisfied. Id. at 3 (and attachment,
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interlocutory review of that suppression motion (Order copied in appendix II). Thus as far as
the trial court is concerned, Hammer has been searched under the now-challenged Probation
Agreement.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. Hammer has waived his challenge to the suspicionless search probation
condition, because he failed to object to it in the trial court. Nor has Hammer proven "plain
error" or "exceptional circumstances" to justify relief from that waiver by default. On this
basis, the suspicionless search provision should be summarily affirmed, without addressing the
merits.
2. If the merits can be reached, affirmance is appropriate. Hammer misrelies
on the Utah Supreme Court's 1983 Velasquez decision under the Fourth Amendment, holding
that probationer searches must be based upon reasonable suspicion, for two reasons. First,
Velasquez does not address whether the "reasonable suspicion" requirement can be waived.
By every indication, it can be waived, and it was voluntarily and knowingly waived by
Hammer. Second, the Velasquez holding has been superseded by subsequent Fourth
Amendment holdings from the United States Supreme Court. Under those decisions, and the
"balancing" analysis articulated in the federal Supreme Court's 1995 Acton decision,
suspicionless probationer searches are permissible.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE SUSPICIONLESS
SEARCH CONDITION OF HIS PROBATION, HAMMER HAS
WAIVED THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL
Hammer cannot overcome the threshold problem of waiver by default. He
argues on appeal that as a matter of Fourth Amendment law, the trial court could not impose
the suspicionless search condition of his Probation Agreement. But in the trial court, Hammer
never objected to the suspicionless search condition. Indeed, he verbally acquiesced to the
condition when the court informed him of it (R. 59-60, copied in appendix I). In the written
Probation Agreement, executed later outside of court, Hammer again acknowledged that
condition by initialling it and signing the Agreement (R. 38, also copied in appendix I). He
therefore waived the issue by default (indeed, as set forth in Point Two of this brief, he
affirmatively waived his protection from suspicionless searches).
Now, on appeal, Hammer fails to demonstrate "plain error" or other
"exceptional circumstances" that would justify excusing that waiver and reaching the merits of
his Fourth Amendment argument. "It is well settled that, absent extraordinary circumstances
or plain error, issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal." U.S. Xpress, Inc. v. State
Tax Comm'n, 886 P.2d 1115, 1119 (Utah App. 1994). Accord State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105,
1113 (Utah 1994); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 922-26 & nn. 2-10 (Utah App. 1991).
The waiver-by-default rule applies with equal force to issues overlooked in sentencing
hearings. See State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798, 801-02 (Utah 1990); State v. Bywater, 748
P.2d 568, 569 (Utah 1987); State v. Rabbins, 733 P.2d 132 (Utah 1987) (per curiam).
6

Hammer, who acknowledges the waiver-by-default rule and even cites Archambeau (Br. of
Appellant at 16), makes no attempt to articulate either exception to this rule. Instead, he
alludes to habeas corpus as "the precious safeguard of personal liberty," and suggests, without
explanation, that his defaulted claim could be raised in a habeas corpus petition, and therefore,
should be entertained on direct appeal (Br. of Appellant at 16-17).
That unsupported suggestion does not carry Hammer's appellate burden of
proving an exception to the waiver rule. "This court has routinely declined to consider
arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal." State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 599, 602
(Utah App. 1992); accord State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). To address
Hammer's defaulted argument now, without proof of plain error or extraordinary
circumstances, would violate the policy that underlies the waiver-by-default rule: "[T]he trial
court should have the first opportunity to address the claim of error." State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993) (citing cases). Hammer never gave the trial court an opportunity
to reconsider, and perhaps delete, the suspicionless search condition of his probation.
That default would make it particularly unfair to the trial court, were this Court
to consider the merits of Hammer's claim on appeal absent a powerful showing of exceptional
circumstances or plain error. Hammer's prayer for relief asks this Court to "vacateQ and set
aside" the suspicionless search provision of his Probation Agreement (Br. of Appellant at 17).
Such relief would amount, in effect, to appellate editing of the trial court's considered
judgment. Such editing would inappropriately divest the trial court of its traditional, broad
discretion to decide whether a guilty defendant can be successfully supervised on probation, or
should instead be committed to prison. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah
7

App. 1991). Therefore, this Court should not address the merits of the Fourth Amendment
issue raised by Hammer, and should summarily affirm the trial court's judgment.
POINT TWO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS RANDOM,
SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AS A CONDITION OF
PROBATION
Were this Court to reach the merits of this appeal, Hammer could not prevail.
Hammer argues that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution bars the
provision for random, suspicionless searches from his Probation Agreement. He disavows any
separate analysis under Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution (Br. of Appellant at 2
n.l). Therefore, merits analysis proceeds solely under the Fourth Amendment.
A.

Utah Fourth Amendment Precedent: Velasquez
Interpreting the Fourth Amendment in State v. Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254

(1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that warrantless searches of parolees are permissible
when State officials have "reasonable grounds"--a standard less than probable cause-to believe
that the parolee has violated parole or committed a crime. Id. at 1260 (the State equates
"reasonable grounds" with the "reasonable suspicion" standard of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968), and its progeny). The court identified its holding as a "middle ground" positionbetween demanding probable cause and requiring no cause for a parolee search. Subsequently,
in State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209-10 (Utah App. 1991), this Court extended the
Velasquez "reasonable grounds" requirement to searches of probationers, whose liberty
interests are limited to the same degree as those of parolees. Accord Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (equating parolees' and probationers' limited liberty interests). See also
8

State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1072 (Utah 1987) (following Velasquez); State v. Blackwell,
809 P.2d 135, 136-39 (Utah App. 1991) (same). Thus Velasquez arguably supports Hammer's
position on appeal.
B.

Knowing Waiver of Velasquez "Reasonable Suspicion" Requirement.
However, in Velasquez, the Utah Supreme Court was not presented with, and

hence did not reach, the question whether a convicted criminal, in order to receive probation
in lieu of incarceration, may affirmatively waive his or her protection against any or all types
of searches, whether or not supported by any level of suspicion. Perusal of other aspects of
criminal law quickly reveals that such waiver is permissible. In entering guilty pleas, criminal
defendants waive all their constitutional trial rights, along with virtually all right of appeal.
See Utah R. Crim. P. 11(e)(3) through -(e)(8); State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987).
That the decision to plead guilty may be difficult, or later regretted, in no way affects the
validity of such waivers. Defendants* who proceed to trial routinely cope with the dilemma
whether to waive the right to remain silent, U.S. Const. Amend. V, and are required to live
with the consequences of their decisions. Similarly, imposition of a probation condition that
happens to be unpleasant or costly does not, ipso facto, operate to invalidate the condition.
Cf. State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041, 1049 n.l (Utah App.) (separate opinion of Davis, J.)
("While choosing probation over prison is nearly a Hobson's choice, it is nevertheless a choice
offered at the discretion of the court"), cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994).
Because Velasquez is silent about whether the "reasonable suspicion"
requirement for probationer searches may be waived, this Court is free to hold that the
requirement can be waived. Such holding would be consistent with State v. Hunter, 831 P.2d
9

1033 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992), in which this Court upheld a
university dormitory room search that was authorized by the housing contract between the
student-defendant and the university. Just as the student in that case agreed to limit his Fourth
Amendment rights by valid contract, so too did Hammer contractually waive the "reasonable
suspicion" limit on probationer searches, in return for the opportunity to receive probation,
rather than face a prison term, for attempted burglary.
This Court can then hold that Hammer knowingly and voluntarily agreed to that
waiver, because the record readily supports such holding. Hammer signed the written
Probation Agreement, initialling each of its conditions, including the special condition of
random searches (R. 38, copied in appendix I). He was orally informed of that condition in
open court, and stated his acceptance of it (R. 60, also copied in appendix I). Just as a written
plea agreement and oral colloquy demonstrated a properly accepted, voluntary no-contest plea
in State v. Smith, 812 P.2d 470, 476-81 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah
1992), so too does the record in this case prove that Hammer knowingly and voluntarily
waived his right, under Velasquez, to be searched only upon reasonable suspicion.
C.

Velasquez Overruled by Later U.S. Supreme Court Holdings.
If this Court does not find a voluntary waiver of Hammer's rights under

Velasquez, Hammer still cannot prevail. The "reasonable suspicion" limitation on probationer
searches, established in Velasquez, is no longer valid. That limitation has been overruled sub
silentio by subsequent United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment,
which both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court are bound to follow. See State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 & n.9 (Utah 1993). Under the United States Supreme Court's
10

interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, Hammer's probation agreement properly requires
him to submit to random, suspicionless searches of his person (including "bodily fluids"),
residence, and property.
1. "Special Needs" Searches and Probationers.
The Supreme Court addressed probationer searches in Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868 (1987), and upheld a warrantless search of a probationer's home that was carried out
pursuant to a Wisconsin regulation that permitted such searches upon "reasonable grounds."
483 U.S. at 870-71. The Wisconsin regulation was deemed constitutionally reasonable
because of the "special need" to closely supervise probationers, and because probationers'
privacy interests are less than those of the public at large. Id. at 873-75. "Special needs"
exist when the governmental interest at stake is "beyond normal law enforcement," and
therefore justifies departure from the warrant requirment. Id. The Court also found the
challenged search reasonable "because it was carried out pursuant to a regulation that itself
satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement under well-established
principles." Id. at 873. Significantly, however, the Court in Griffin did not hold that the
"reasonable grounds" requirement, contained within the Wisconsin regulation, was itself
constitutionally required. See id. at 872 (declining to decide whether federal "reasonable
grounds" standard must be met); id. at 875-76 (deferring definition of "reasonable grounds" to
the Wisconsin state courts). Thus Griffin reserved the question whether a probationer search
might be permissible without any level of individualized suspicion.
That question is now answered affirmatively, if tacitly, by other Supreme Court
decisions. Most recently and compellingly, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,
11

U.S.

, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995), the Court approved a public school district's policy of

random urinalysis drug testing for student-athletes. Like probationer searches, the Supreme
Court observed that public school searches serve "special needs." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391
(citing Griffin). Canvassing its precedent, the Court further stated that "special needs"
searches can be justified without any individualized suspicion: "[T]he Fourth Amendment
imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion." Id. (quoting authority). The Court
acknowledged other instances wherein suspicionless searches and seizures were held to be
reasonable. Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (roadblock sobriety
checkpoints); Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (random drug testing of
customs officers who are armed or involved in drug interdiction); Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (drug testing of railroad personnel involved in train
accidents); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (border checkpoints for
illegal immigrants and contraband). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 555-60 (1979)
(unnanounced cell searches, and post-jail visit body searches of pretrial detainees were
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment). Cf. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987)
(government employers may search employees' desks without probable cause); Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches without probable cause).
2. The "Reasonableness" Test for Special Needs Searches.
In Acton, the Court also articulated the test for determining the reasonableness
of "special needs" searches. Broadly described, such a search "is judged by balancing its
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the promotion of legitimate

12

governmental interests." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2390 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (in turn
quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)). More specifically, this balancing
analysis examines three factors: (1) the "nature of the privacy interest" upon which the search
intrudes, Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391; (2) the "character of the intrusion" upon that interest, id.
at 2393; and (3) "the nature and immediacy of the governmental concern" raised to justify the
search, and "the efficacy of this means for meeting it," id. at 2394.
Notably absent from the foregoing balancing analysis is any reference to
governmental regulations as benchmarks for Fourth Amendment protection. Thus while the
content of a regulation can help a reviewing court to determine whether a "special needs"
search is constitutional, as happened in Griffin, the existence vel non of regulations does not
determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protection: after all, a policy or regulation could
violate the Constitution. State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1138 (Utah 1994). Therefore, by
invoking the probationer search regulations of the Utah Department of Corrections, which
contain a "reasonable suspicion" requirement, Hammer gets the cart before the horse (Br. of
Appellant at 10-14). While those regulations must obey Fourth Amendment law, they do not
define that law. The Department's requirement of "reasonable suspicion" for probationer
searches merely reflects its acceptance of the Utah Supreme Court's Velasquez decision as
Fourth Amendment authority. That authority, however, is no longer good law. Instead, the
balancing analysis set forth in Acton supports random, suspicionless probationer searches.
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3. Reasonableness of Random Probationer Searches.
Application of the federal Supreme Court's balancing analysis, with comparison
to the Court's pertinent precedent, demonstrates that the Fourth Amendment permits
suspicionless searches as a term of probation:
Nature of the Privacy Interest
It is clear that probationers have limited privacy interests. On this point, Utah
courts are in accord with the United States Supreme Court:
Probation is simply one point (or, more accurately, one set of points) on
a continuum of possible punishments ranging for solitary confinement in
a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community
service. . . . To a greater or lesser degree, it is always true of
probationers (as we have said it to be true of parolees) that they do not
enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . .
conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
[probation] restrictions.
Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (citation and quotation omitted). Accord Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1258
(parolees have "diminished expection of privacy"); Martinez, 811 P.2d at 209-10 (same for
probationers).
And a criminal probationer, by definition guilty of a criminal offense, surely
has no greater privacy interest than a public school student who desires to participate in sports,
or a railroad employee unfortunate enough to be involved in an accident. Yet in Acton, the
Supreme Court upheld suspicionless, random searches of student-athletes; in Skinner, drug
screening of railroaders involved in accidents was approved. And if law enforcement officers
may be subjected to random drug screening, as the Court held in Von Raab, surely adjudicated
lawbreakers can expect no greater privacy. The privacy interests of pretrial detainees, not yet
14

convicted of any crime, yield to suspicionless searches under Bell v. Wolfish. Nor does a
convicted criminal's interest in the privacy of his or her residence approach the "sanctity"
level, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980), accorded to the ordinary citizen:
Griffin, after all, upheld the search of a probationer's home.
It also appears proper to compare the privacy loss that would be inflicted upon a
criminal who is imprisoned, rather than granted probation. Under Utah law, such a decision
is left to the virtually unfettered discretion of sentencing courts. See, e.g., State v. Jameson,
800 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1990). A prison setting, like a student-athlete's locker room, is
surely "not for the bashful," Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392, in terms of privacy loss: a prison
typically is designed to allow inmate surveillance at all times-including sleeping, showering,
and toileting. If a sentencing court can impose such a dramatic, chronic privacy deprivation
upon a convicted criminal, it must have the discretion to impose a lesser deprivation-such as
probation that includes random, suspicionless searches. Indeed, it seems a safe bet that most
criminals, given the choice, would readily choose the latter situation over the former. As a
matter of both precedent and logic, then, probationers such as Hammer have very limited
"legitimate expectations of privacy."
Character of the Intrusion
The character of the intrusion caused by random probationer searches also
supports their permissibility under the Fourth Amendment. For one thing, as just explained,
the intrusion caused by an occasional random search is far less onerous than day-to-day life in
prison. Cf. Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (a parolee's "condition is very
different from that of confinement in a prison"); Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1258 n.l (parolee
15

enjoys privacy rights not granted to prisoners). And as Hammer admits, probationers
routinely live under a panoply of special expectations and restrictions: "The probationer's
physical mobility and personal associations are restricted. He is required to provide a regular
accounting which may include the status of his employment, schooling, mental health or
substance abuse counselling or therapy, payment of fines and restitution, etc." (Br. of
Appellant at 11). Hammer's Probation Agreement includes such requirements, plus a ban on
firearms possession (waiving Second Amendment rights), a ban on alcohol consumption
(normally legal for someone of Hammer's age, R. 3), and a requirement that he "pay a
supervision fee" of $30 per month unless granted a waiver . . . " (R. 38, appendix I of this
brief). Hammer does not contest the legitimacy of these restrictions. Compared to them, the
occasional intrusion of a random, suspicionless search cannot amount, per se, to a
constitutional violation.
Yet this is not to say that the character of a particular probationer search might
not be so harsh as to justify Fourth Amendment disapproval. It is now settled that even a
warrant-supported search might be unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment's
"reasonableness" clause. See Wilson v. Arkansas,

U.S.

, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995)

("knock-and-announce" rule is part of reasonableness inquiry for warrant-supported search);
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 560 ("The [pretrial detainee] searches must be conducted in a
reasonable manner"); Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1263 (searches may not be used to harass or
intimidate). Cf. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (police may not use deadly force to
seize suspect absent indication of immediate danger (due process analysis)). Thus there are
inherent constitutional limitations on the manner in which state officials may conduct their
16

warrantless, suspicionless searches of probationer Hammer. To illustrate by extreme example,
officials cannot hang Hammer by his heels, strip him naked in public, or tear down his home
to conduct the searches authorized in his Probation Agreement: the manner in which they
search him must be constitutionally reasonable. And by analogy to "scope-of-consent"
analysis, a probationer search ought not exceed the scope of the probation agreement. But until
and unless Hammer is subjected to such an unreasonable search (and no such situation is either
alleged or apparent in this case), he has no Fourth Amendment complaint.1
In fact, with respect to the "bodily fluids" searches, state officials have
committed themselves to conducting such searches in a minimally intrusive manner. Under
Corrections Department policy FEr21 (copied in Br. of Appellant addendum E), primarily
designed for incarcerated inmates but adaptable to "Field Testing," FEr21/04.04, same-sex
testers collect urine samples, taking measures to make the process as private as realistically
possible. In Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2393-94, the Supreme Court noted similar privacy-protecting
measures in holding that student-athlete drug screening was not unduly intrusive.
It also bears note that Hammer has not been permanently deprived of his
protection against warrantless, suspicionless searches. Like any probation agreement,
Hammer's is of limited term-set by the trial court at thirty-six months (R. 42). Once that
term has been successfully completed, all restrictions, including the searches, will end. In

1

Hammer includes an incompletely developed argument that his Probation Agreement
does not consent to searches by persons other than his probation officers (Br. of Appellant at
10). That argument is best deferred by this Court pending development on a more complete
argument and trial court record-probably in Hammer II (described in the fact statement of this
brief), if that case results in a conviction and appeal.
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sum, the character of the intrusion is sufficiently limited to allow suspicionless probationer
searches-both in general and in this case.
Nature and Immediacy of State Concern; Efficacy
Finally, the importance of the State's interest cannot be disputed. The Supreme
Court described the interests served by rail worker searches and customs officer searches as
"compelling." Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394 (quoting Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628, and Von Raab,
489 U.S. at 670). And in Griffin, the Court suggested, while reserving the question, that
probationer searches might be justified simply on the basis that they serve "legitimate
penological interests." 483 U.S. at 874 & n.2 (citing cases). In Velasquez, the Utah Supreme
Court seemingly found powerful justifications for parolee searches:
If the parole system is to be successful in achieving its objective of
enabling a convict to leave a highly controlled prison environment and
move to a point of less restraint and greater freedom in preparation for
reentry into society, a parole officer needs to be able to act in a manner
that could not be tolerated if done by a policeman or other agent of the
state with respect to an ordinary citizen.
Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1259. The foregoing language emphasizes rehabilitation, a special
goal of both parole and probation, and indicates that the State's interest in searches as a means
toward that goal is a powerful one. Thus Hammer properly concedes that the State's interest
in probationer searches is "legitimate" (Br. of Appellant at 8).
Whatever level of governmental interest exists, or is required, to justify
probationer searches, this much is clear: the interest advanced by suspicionless probationer
searches is powerful. States, through their correctional authorities, are highly interested in
utilizing probation as an effective rehabilitation and anti-recidivism tool. That interest is
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surely as important as the goal of preventing student-athlete drug use. See Acton, slip op. at
15 ("the nature of the concern is important-indeed, perhaps compelling . . . " ) . Cf. United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987) (the "government's interest in preventing crime
by arrestees is both legitimate and compelling"). This, too, supports suspicionless searches as
a probation condition.2
And Utah citizens, like those throughout the nation, are highly concerned about
crime, yet also concerned about the costs of incarceration. Crowded prisons and jails create
pressures for alternative ways to effectively supervise convicted criminals, and therefore deter
recidivism. In Utah, experiencing overall population growth, these pressures are increasing.
Freedom from the "reasonable grounds" requirement for probationer and parolee searches will
help to relieve those pressures. Probation and parole, as alternatives to incarceration, can be
more readily ordered by sentencing courts upon assurance that the supervision of the criminals
so sentenced will be intensive and liberally exercised.
Turning to the efficacy question, Hammer admits that "the greater the intensity
of the [probation] supervision, the greater the compliance with the terms of probation will
likely be" (Br. of Appellant at 15). The truth of that proposition seems self-evident: a
probationer's knowledge that he or she can be searched at any moment should provide a

2

Appellate courts in Illinois and Washington have held that the law enforcement need to
effectively investigate future sex offenses justifies saliva and blood sampling of convicted sex
offenders, in order to create and maintain a DNA-type database. People v. Wealer, 264 111.
App. 3d 6, 201 111. Dec. 697, 636 N.E.2d 1129 (App. 2 Dist), review denied, 157 111. 2d
519, 205 111. Dec. 182, 642 N.E.2d 1299 (1994); State v. Olivas, 122 Wash. 2d 73, 856 P.2d
1076 (1993). These cases also discuss the "special needs" and "balancing" Fourth
Amendment analysis utilized in this case.
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powerful incentive to not just avoid the appearance of unlawful behavior, but to actually avoid
such behavior altogether. Additionally, given the high cost of incarceration (state-provided
shelter, food, supervision, medical care), the relative cost-effectiveness of intensive probation
supervision, including random, suspicionless searches, has to be dramatic. Nor does it make
good sense to render every probationer search subject to judicial review for "reasonable
suspicion," as the Utah Supreme Court's Velasquez and Johnson holdings now require. That
requirement forces probation officers to become versed in that elusive, often inconsistentlydefined term, detracting them from their primary duties of supervision and rehabilitation. See
Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396 (restricting student-athlete searches to individualized suspicion
requirement distracts school personnel from their primary duties).
And Hammer is mistaken in suggesting, by quoting Brinegar v. United States,
380 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (Br. of Appellant at 15), that
suspicionless probationer searches might be equated with the abuses of Nazi Germany.
Intensive supervision of persons duly convicted of violating democratically-enacted laws
simply does not compare to the executive fiat-based abuses of that era, directed against wholly
innocent citizens. If a duly convicted criminal can be successfully supervised and rehabilitated
by probation conditions that include random searches, that option cannot be regarded as
"arbitrary," Brinegar, 380 U.S. at 180, and it should be available at sentencing. Limitation of
supervisory ability, under the "reasonable grounds" requirement for probationer searches, will
only chill trial court willingness to order probation rather than incarceration for offenders such
as Hammer.
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Finally, it bears remembering that Hammer, at sentencing, was recognized as a
person with a drug abuse problem. Thus he had a history of surreptitious criminal behavior.
The best way to monitor Hammer's success in ending that behavior, and arguably the best
incentive for him to end it, was to subject him to random searches, just as the student-athletes
in Acton were subjected to random testing. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559 (body cavity
searches viewed as effective deterrent to contraband smuggling); State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho
119, 867 P.2d 993, 997 (Idaho App. 1993) (defendant's history of drug abuse supported
Fourth Amendment waiver as condition of probation). On balance, then, and in line with
federal Supreme Court authority, this Court should hold that suspicionless probationer
searches are permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
CONCLUSION
By virtue of the waiver explained in Point One of this brief, this Court should
affirm the trial court's judgment, without necessity of oral argument. If the Court reaches the
merits of this appeal, its should affirm for the reasons set forth in Point Two. In light of the
potentially broad ramifications of a merits ruling on Point Two, however, oral argument
would be appropriate. Under either point, the judgment should be AFFIRMED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _^£_ day of November, 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHYVJ
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

DEPARTW E ^ # QDRReCTIONS

Fifth District

PROBAnO%*iRJcEMENT

Washington

Court

County

951500040

00081991

Case#

OBSCIS #

I, P a x B r a n t Hammer
, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of Corrections and to be
accountable for my actions and conduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court.
I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the court and set forth in this Agreement, consistent with the laws of the
state of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this agreement and/or any conditions thereof, or any new conviction for a crime, may result in
action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my probation period to commence again.
1. VISITS:

I will permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere by Agents of Adult Probation and
Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of my Probation Agreement.

2. REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS:

I will not abscond from Probation Supervision.
REPORTING:
I will report as directed by the Department of Corrections.
RESIDENCE:
I will establish and reside at a residence of record and will not change my residence without
first obtaining permission from my Probation Agent.
LEAVING THE STATE: I will not leave the state of Utah, even briefly, or any other state to which I am
released or transferred without prior written permission from my Probation Agent.

vn

jeportinq Instructions;

T will report with in the first five working davs of each month and meet

with my <aipprvising aggnt in person as well as providing a written report.

3. CONDUCT:

I will obey all State, Federal and Municipal laws. IF ARRESTED, CITED, or QUESTIONED by a peace officer, I will notify
my Probation Agent within 48 hours.

4. WEAPONS:

I will not possess, have under my control, in my custody or on the premises where I reside, any EXPLOSIVES,
FIREARMS or DANGEROUS WEAPONS. (Dangerous weapon is defined as any item that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.) Exceptions to this condition may be made by the
supervising agent and must be in writing. This waiver will only apply to individuals on probation for a misdemeanor and
who have never been convicted of a felony.

5. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS:

I shall abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled
substances (58-37-2 U.C.A.) and I will submit to tests of my BREATH or BODY FLUIDS to ensure compliance with my
Probation Agreement.

6. SEARCHES:

I will permit Agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search my PERSON, RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property
under my control, without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the
conditions of my Probation Agreement.

7. ASSOCIATION:

I will not knowingly associate with any person who is involved in CRIMINAL activity or who has been CONVICTED OF A
FELONY without approval from my Probation Agent.

8. EMPLOYMENT:

Unless otherwise authorized by my Probation Agent, I will SEEK, OBTAIN and MAINTAIN verifiable, lawful, full-time
employment (32 hours per week minimum) as approved by my Probation Agent. I will notify my Probation Agent of any
change in my employment within 48 hours of the change.

9. TRUTHFULNESS:

I will be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all my dealings with Adult Probation & Parole.

10. SUPERVISION FEE:

I agree to pay a supervision fee of $30 per month unless granted a waiver by the Department under the provisions of
Utah Statute 64-13-21.

11A SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

\S[j^erve 66 days in jail with credit for time served .

Maintain
Full-Time Employment or Edu.
^

plete a Substance Abuse Evaluation with SWIMi A/D and follow all recommendations.
jtbmit to random tests of breath or bodily fluids, and random searches of person and property.
EffiJot use or possess any alcohol or illegal drugs. yiyReport all perscriptions to APSP with in
24 hours is issue.jflfc Pav a fine in the amount of 1,157.00 directly to the 5th District Court.
I have read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate any of the conditions of this agreement, the Court may revoke my
Probation or the Department of Corrections may take other appropriate action against me, and I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this
agreement.
Dated this

day of

April

AttS

finessed By:

^ t)>
i.

JL

%

Eric A. Ludlow #5104
Washington County Attorney
W. Brent Langston #4614
Deputy Washington County Attorney
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770
(801) 634-5723

Ari

FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
J•
]I

DAX BRANT HAMMER,

))

JUDGMENT, SENTENCE, STAY OF
EXECUTION OF SENTENCE, ORDER
OF PROBATION, AND COMMITMENT
Criminal No. 951500040
Judge: James L. Shumate

Defendant.
The above-entitled matter having come on before the Court
for Sentencing on the 29th day of March, 1995, and the Plaintiff
being represented by W, Brent Langston, Deputy Washington County
Attorney, and the Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, being present and
represented by Alan D. Boyack, and said Defendant having previously
entered a guilty plea to the charge of ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, a 3rd
Degree Felony, as charged in the Amended Information, and both
counsel having stated that there was no reason why judgment should
not be entered herein, the Defendant's Attorney having made
recommendations to the Court regarding sentencing, and the
Plaintiff's Attorney having made his recommendation, and the Court
having received a Pre-sentence Investigation Report and the matter
having been submitted; the Court being fully advised in the
premises, now makes and enters the following:
JUDGMENT
IT IS HEREBY FOUND, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the

m

Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, is guilty of ATTEMPTED BURGLARY, a 3rd
Degree Felony, as charged in the Amended Information.
SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the
Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, is sentenced to serve a term not
exceeding five (5) years in the Utah State Prison.
STAY OF EXECUTION OF SENTENCE
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
execution of the prison term imposed above, is stayed.
ORDER OF PROBATION
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, is placed on supervised probation for
a period of thirty six (36) months, strictly within the following
terms, provisions and conditions:
1.

That the Defendant shall forthwith make and execute a

form of an agreement of probation as provided by the Utah State
Department of Adult Probation and Parole, and shall strictly
conform with all of the terms, provisions, and conditions thereof
during the period of probation, and the same are hereby made a part
of this Order by means of incorporation.
2.

That the Defendant shall report as ordered and

required by this Court and by the Utah State Department of Adult
Probation and Parole.
3.

That the Defendant shall commit no law violations.

4.

That the Defendant shall serve sixty six (66) days in

the Washington County Jail, and shall receive credit for time
previously served.
5.

That the Defendant shall pay a fine in the amount of
2

one thousand one hundred fifty seven dollars ($1,157.00), which
includes an eight-five percent (85%) surcharge for victim
reparation, pursuant to monthly payment schedule with Adult
Probation and Parole.
6.

That the Defendant shall maintain full-time

employment or school.
7.

That the Defendant shall obtain a substance abuse

evaluation with Southwest Utah Mental Health, and if recommended,
enter into, successfully complete, and pay for counseling.
8.

That the Defendant shall use no drugs.

9.

That the Defendant shall use no alcohol.

10.

That the Defendant shall report this conviction to

any attending physician before receiving a prescription and if so,
shall report the receipt of said prescription to Adult Probation
and Parole within 48 hours.
11.

That the Defendant shall submit to a search of his

person, possessions, and residence upon the request of his
supervising agent of Adult Probation and Parole, peace officer, or
any official of any program enrolled in, including submitting to a
urinalysis or other tests for controlled substances and/or alcohol.
COMMITMENT
THE SHERIFF OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, State of Utah, is
hereby commanded to commit the Defendant, DAX BRANT HAMMER, to the
Washington County Jail, there to be kept and^g^efiwj§^ in accordance
& V ..•••*... '- N^

with the above Order.
DATED this

A
/L

day of May,

DISTRlte'^VRf""jtj#!?£ .;.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, STATE OF UTAH
HON. JAMES L. SHUMATE, judge

STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

DAX BRANT HAMMER,

)

Defendant.

)

Criminal No. 951500040

(Tape-Recorded Proceedings)

REPORTER'S HEARING TRANSCRIPT
Wednesday, March 29, 1995
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL;
For the State:

W. BRENT LANGSTON, ESQ.
DEPUTY WASHINGTON COUNTY ATTORNEY
178 North 200 East
St. George, Utah 84770

For the Defendant:

ALAN D. BOYACK, ESQ.
205 East Tabernacle Street
St. George, Utah 84770
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THE COURT: Mr. Boyack, is this a good time to
do the Hammer matter?

To call it a little early?

MR. BOYACK:

I believe so.

THE COURT: All right.

Is the defendant here,

or do you want to go get him?
MR. LANGSTON:

He's here.

MR. BOYACK:

I just ~

He's incarcerated.

that's where I was.

I

was speaking to the defendant's mother.
THE COURT: All right.
MR. BOYACK:
THE COURT:

And we can proceed now.
Do you want her to be here?

She's

not here.
MR. BOYACK:

I don't think it's necessary.

I

think we can proceed.
THE COURT: All right.
recommendations.

I intend to follow the

But if Mrs. Hammer wants to be here, I

will certainly hold off.
Let me call that matter, then.

951500040, State

of Utah versus Dax Brant Hammer.
Mr. Hammer, will you come down with your
attorney, Mr. Boyack.
This is the time and place set for sentencing in

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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this case.

I have received the presentence report and find

that it's a favorable recommendation.

I intend to follow

it.
Anything else you want to say, Mr. Boyack?
MR. BOYACK:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Hammer, is there anything you
want to tell the Court before I impose sentence?
MR. HAMMER:

No. There's nothing.

THE COURT: Mr. Langston, is there anything you
want to add?
MR. LANGSTON:

Your Honor, in the plea

agreement, we agreed to recommend that the defendant be
granted a stay of imposition of sentence, and also that he
receive counseling.

We believe that he —

it's a fact that

he does need counseling for substance abuse problems and
other problems that have happened in his life, and we
believe that that should be ordered.
the —

That is part of

it talks about an evaluation and —

number five of the recommendation.

in paragraph

We certainly think that

should be done. And then any counseling followed up on
that.
And we'll submit it on that basis.
THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Counsel.

Anything else, Mr. Boyack?
MR. BOYACK:

Yes, Your Honor.

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

I just want the

4
Court to know that I've had an opportunity to get to know
Dax.

When Dax didn't showf he voluntarily —

himself back.

he rushed

And Dax and I have had some long talks about

the substance abuse, and we keep talking about that —

he

seems to think it's a problem, and the State and perhaps
the Court thinks that it's a problem.

Dax may or may not

be in denial. And I want to give him some benefit of the
doubt in that if it was a problem, he's had a
detoxification forcibly imposed upon him, and I think that
from our talks in the jail facility that he knows and
understand that he's subject to periodic testing.

And

—

and so in a sense, he may have had the very best of a
rehabilitation period during his incarceration period, and
I hope that that might be enough.
On the other hand, we don't want to forestall
the counseling that's recommended.
idea.

We think that's a good

I would simply state that if the Court has any

reservations about Dax, at least he has detoxified, and I
think has an excellent attitude now to proceed and go on
with his life.
THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Hammer, it's the

sentence of the Court that you be incarcerated in the Utah
State Prison for a period of time not to exceed five
years•
I'm going to stay the imposition of any fine.

PAULG.MCMULLIN
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I'm going to stay the execution of the sentence.

I'm

afraid your days as a ski bum are over.
MR. HAMMER:
THE COURT:

I think so.
I think so too.

Besides, the ski

season is about over now anyway.
Let me tell you the way it looks to those of us
who have been involved in the system as long as Mr. Boyack
and Mr. Langston and I have been involved.

It looks like

you were wandering around, didn't have much to do and
suddenly saw a way to convert somebody else's property into
cash for drugs. That's ordinarily the way it looks like.
It may not be precisely that, but I want you to think about
what it looks like to those of us who see a lot of these
things.

And that's the basis for the Court's order.
First term of your probation.

I'm going to

place you on probation for 36 months and to serve 66 days
in the Washington County Jail, with credit for time
served.

And you're getting out of the jail today.
Next term of your probation —

and I'm putting

them in the order of importance to the Court —

is that you

maintain full-time, gainful, legitimate employment or
education.
Mr. Hammer, there's no reason in the world for
you not to achieve a great deal in your life.
the brains; you've got the drive.

You've got

Frankly, you've got the

PAULG.MCMULLIN
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heritage to do just about anything you want to do.

2

days as a ski bun are over. At least for the next three

3

years.

4

that, I guess you could.

5

by the tine you get to be ny age, your body begins to give

6

out on you, and being a ski bun doesn't work nuch any

7

nore.

8

if you don't have sone training, sone background, sone

9

profession, your life can be really enpty.

10
11

So your

If you want to go back to that life-style after
But I think you'll find out that

It's not as nuch fun as it night be right now.

And

And there's no

reason for you to have an enpty life.
Next tern of your probation is that I want you

12

to subnit to a substance abuse evaluation through Southwest

13

Mental Health and conply with all recommendations nade as a

14

result of that evaluation.

15

If they evaluate you and determine that you are

16

not chemically dependent, then they won't nake any further

17

recommendations.

18

and I suspect they nay find —

19

the problen now.

20

fron now after you have been found in violation of your

21

probation for using drugs that you couldn't get away from

22

and have to go off to the prison.

But if they do nake that determination

then I want you to deal with

Don't deal with it two and a half years

23

Any question about that tern?

24

MR. HAMMER:

25

THE COURT:

No. Not really.
Okay.

—

You will subnit to random

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER

6*1

7
urinalysis and other testing of your breath and bodily
fluids.

And you'll submit to a search of your person, your

premises or any property under your control or any vehicle
under your control to determine whether or not you are
using or possessing controlled substances or alcohol.

You

will not use alcohol or controlled substances during the
term of your probation.

You will report this offense to

any doctor with whom you consult, and you will report any
prescription that you get to Adult Probation and Parole
within 24 hours.

If you're at work and drop a brick on

your foot, and you need a prescription, that's up to the
doctor to make that decision.

But I just don't want a drug

test to come up positive, and everybody be surprised,
because you forgot to report a prescription.

So tell them

of any drugs that you're taking under prescription.
Any question about that one?
MR. HAMMER:

No, sir.

THE COURT: All right.
in the amount of $1,150 —

Now, you will pay a fine

57. There's a $625 fine plus

the 85 percent surcharge.
You will be released from the jail. And I don't
expect to see you back except to have this matter
successfully completed at the end of your probation or such
sooner time as you have satisfied Adult Probation and
Parole that you're going to no longer involve yourself in

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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controlled substances or criminal conduct.
Any questions?
MR. HAMMER:

No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Good luck to you.

You have the right to appeal any error of the
Court in this proceeding.

You have to file a notice of

appeal within 30 days of today's date.
longer than that, you lose your chance.

If you wait any
And you do that by

filing a written notice of appeal with the clerk of the
Court.
Any questions about that, sir?
MR. HAMMER:
THE COURT:

No.
Good luck to you, sir.

MR. HAMMER:
THE COURT:

I would like to know one thing.
Yes, sir.

MR. HAMMER:

I did contact Gary Webb of

Southwest Mental Health — whatever it is.
THE COURT: Uh-huh.
MR. HAMMER:

And he did come and see me, and I

did get money into the jail so I could get the evaluation.
And he told me he'd show up the next morning, and he did
not show up.
THE COURT: Well, you'll be able to get at him
yourself now.

You can wait on his desk rather than wait on

him to come to you.

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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Good luck to you.
MR. HAMMER:

All right.

MR. BOYACK:

Thank you, Your Honor,

(Whereupon, the proceedings in the
above-entitled matter were concluded.)

PAULG.MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH
) SS.

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON )

I, PAUL G. MCMULLIN, CSR, RPR, an Official Court
Reporter in and for the Fifth Judicial District, State of
Utah, do hereby certify:
That the foregoing natter, to wit, STATE OF UTAH
VS. DAZ BRANT HAMMER, CRIMINAL NO. 951500040, was
tape-recorded at the time and place therein named and
thereafter, to the best of my listening and understanding,
reduced to computerized transcription.
I further testify that I am not interested in
the event of the action.
WITNESS my hand and seal this 6th day of July,
1995.

, yri'Vn^A^
PAUL G.

IN, CSR, RPR

NOTA?N P l ' b U r
PAL'LG MCMULLIK
43^ Nnr*»- 5 = Wes4 C«rc»e

RESIDING AT: St. George, Utah !~~
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 3-17-99

* ')

PAUL G. MCMULLIN
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
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Mv Commissior ExD»f«s
Ma'cn 17m 199&
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564)
Attorney for Defendant and Petitioner
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St George, Utah 84770
Ph: (801) 628-4411
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

)

Plaintiff and Respondent, )
vs.

PETITION FOR PERMISSION
TO APPEAL INTERLOCUTORY
ORDER

)

DAX BRANT HAMMER,

)

Washington County Case No. 951500444 FS
Case No.

Defendant and Petitioner. )
1. Dax Brant Hammer (hereinafter "defendant"), through counsel, Gary W.
Pendleton, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals to permit an appeal from an interlocutory
order of the Honorable James L. Shumate, Fifth District Court, entered in this matter on
June 26,1995. Specifically, defendant seeks permission to appeal the district court's order
denying the defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence which the state intends to use
in defendant's pending prosecution on a charge of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE, a second degree felony.
2. A photocopy of the order for which review is sought is attached hereto as
Exhibit "A". The supporting findings and conclusions are included as part of the order.
3. STATEMENT OF FACTS. In the early afternoon of April 18,1995, St
George City police officers and Washington County Sheriffs deputies executed a search
warrant at the residence of one Ray Adams in Santa Qara, Utah. The warrant ordered
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peace officers to search the residence "as well as all persons present during execution of the
search warrant.11 Because defendant was visiting the Adams residence when police officers
arrived, his person was also searched.
Defendant was charged with POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE (methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a public park), a second degree
felony, and POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA (within 1000 feet of a public
park), a class A misdemeanor. Following preliminary hearing, the paraphernalia charge was
dismissed and defendant was ordered to answer the controlled substance charge.
Following arraignment, defendant moved the district court to quash the search
warrant and suppress the state's physical evidence. Defendant claimed standing to attack
the search warrant because the warrant was directed at him as someone who was "present
during the execution of the search warrant.11
Defendant contended that the police officer affiant who applied for the search
warrant had, in an attempt to establish an undisclosed informant's reliability, falsely
described the informant as "a citizen with no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain from
providing this information." This undisclosed informant was one Kelly Moore. Moore was
in fact presently facing criminal charges in three separate proceedings, one of which was a
felony charge which was pending preliminary hearing.
Defendant subpoenaed Moore to testify at the suppression hearing. Moore
failed to comply with the subpoena. Defendant proceeded with the hearing as far as he
could without Moore's testimony. The district court issued a bench warrant for Moore's
arrest and continued the hearing. Although the hearing was ultimately continued three
times, defendant was never able to compel Moore's attendance as a witness.
Because defendant had not been able to secure pretrial release, defense
2

counsel finally asked the court to rule on defendant's motion to suppress based upon the
testimony which the court had already heard. Counsel asked that in the event the court
upheld the search warrant, defendant be allowed to revisit the issue when and if Moore's
attendance as a witness could be compelled.
The district court then, after expressing concern about the application for the
search warrant but without deciding whether or not the warrant had been properly issued,
denied defendant's motion to suppress for the following reasons: (1) Defendant had been
recently convicted of Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony, and was on probation under
the supervision of the office of Adult Probation and Parole; (2) Under the terms of the
order of probation, defendant was obliged to submit to searches of any peace officer upon
"reasonable suspicion11;1 and (3) Even if the affidavit supporting the issuance of the search
warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause, the information set forth therein, was
sufficient to establish "reasonable suspicion".
The district court had indicated that in the event defendant were able to
secure Moore's attendance, the court would hear additional evidence on the question of
whether or not the search warrant had been properly issued. However, that issue has
become academic in light of the district court's ruling that the search was legal without the
warrant.
Defendant has perfected a timely appeal from the judgment, sentence and
order of probation entered upon his Attempted Burglaiy conviction. That appeal is
presently pending before the court of appeals as Case No. 950380-CA The only issue on
that appeal is the validity of the term of probation which requires the defendant to "submit

Actually, the written order of probation contains no "reasonable suspicion* requirement
3

to a search of his person, possessions, and residence upon the request o f . . . peace officer
tt

4. QUESTIONS OF LAW:
(a) Was the defendant, by virtue of the order of probation entered as a result
of his attempted burglary conviction, under a legal obligation to submit to a warrantless
search by any peace officer?
(b) Was the defendant, under said probation order, properly required to
submit to warrantless searches for controlled substances?
(c) Did the defendant, by accepting probation in the prior criminal proceeding,
waive his Fourth Amendment rights?
5. ISSUES RAISED IN TRIAL COURT: The precise legal issues presented
for review by this proposed interlocutory appeal were fully and fairly presented to the district
court and the district court ruled on each question presented. This is apparent from a
review of the minute entries which are attached hereto as Exhibit TB". See Minute Entry,
May 18, 1995, at pp. 2-3; Minute Entry, May 26, 1995, at p.2; and Minute Entry, May 31,
1995, at pp. 1-2.
Specifically, in the proceedings before the district court, defense counsel
advanced the following arguments and cited the following authorities:
(a) A probationer's Fourth Amendmentrightsmay be curtailed by the court's
probation order to the extent, but only to the extent, reasonably necessary to facilitate the
administration of an effective system of probation. State v. Velasquez. 672 P.2d 1254
(1983)(parole case).
(b) A term of probation which modifies the probationer's Fourth Amendment
rights must be reasonably related to the offense of which he was convicted. Sprague v.
4

State. 590 P.2d 410 (Alaska 1979)(burglary probationer not properly required to submit to
warrantless searches for narcotics).
(c) While the administration of an effective system of probation may require
submission to warrantless searches by probation officers based upon nothing more than
xeasonable suspicion, a probation order cannot properly require a probationer to submit to
searches by any law enforcement officer. Elkins v. State, 388 So. 2d 1314 (FkuApp. D5
1980); State v. Fields. 686 P.2d 1379 (Hawaii 1984).
(d) A criminal defendant who, faced with a term of incarceration, accepts
probation on condition that he waive his Fourth Amendment rights does not voluntarily
waive his constitutional rights. Dearth v. State. 390 So.2d 108 (FlaApp. D4 1980).
6. IMMEDIATE APPEAL NECESSARY: Unless the issues presented by this
proposed interlocutory appeal are resolved prior to trial, defendant is in jeopardy of being
convicted and incarcerated on the basis of evidence which was obtained in violation of his
fundamental rights. Furthermore, as long as the district court upholds the admissibility of
the state's evidence based upon a theoiy that the defendant cannot assert anyrightunder
the Fourth Amendment, there is no need for the district court to seriously consider the
issues of whether or not the search warrant was properly issued and whether or not it
properly authorized the search of "all persons present during the execution of the search
warrant." Finally, the consolidation of this case with defendant's pending appeal of the
probation order entered in the Attempted Burglary case (Case No. 950380-CA) would
advance the interests of judicial economy inasmuch as the proposed interlocutory appeal and
Case No. 950380-CA present issues which are nearly identical. Moreover, the proposed
interlocutory appeal presents facts and circumstances which give dimension to the bare legal
issues presented by the appeal in Case No. 950380-CA.
5

7. ADVANCEMENT OF TERMINATION OF LITIGATION: Determination
of the issues presented by the proposed interlocutory appeal will likely dispose of this
litigation by dismissal or settlement.
DATED this <- /day June, IS
Gary W. Pentifl$ton/
Attorney for Defendant and Petitioner
MAILING/DEUVERY CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that I did serve the above document this ^ /day of June,
1995, by delivering a true copy thereof to Eric Ludlow, Washington County Attorney, 178
North 200 East, St. George, Utah, and by mailing a true copy thereof to Jan Graham, Utah
Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, 236 State Capitol Bldg., Salt Lake City, Utah
84114.

Gary W. Pe:
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GARY W. PENDLETON (2564)
Attorney for Defendant
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St George, Utah 84770
Ph: (801) 628-4411
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]
]>

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAX BRANT HAMMER,
Defendant.

)

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS,
AND ORDER DENYING MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

;)

Case No. 951500444

)

Judge James L. Shumate

This matter came on for further hearing following an evidentiary hearing which
was conducted on defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of the
defendant's person which search was conducted on or about April 18,1995. In the course
of the proceedings on the motion to suppress, defendant has been unable to procure the
compulsory attendance of one Kelly Moore who has now been identified by law enforcement
oflScers as an undisclosed informant in the application for the search warrant under which
the subject search was initiated. There are presently outstanding warrants for Mr. Moore's
arrest not only in this proceeding but also in at least one criminal proceeding in which he
is a defendant.

1
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The court specificallyfindsthat given the information which has come to light
regarding Mr. Moore's difficulties with law enforcement prior to the application for the
search warrant, the court is disinclined to rely upon that portion of the search warrant which
identifies Moore as "a citizen with no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain from providing
this information." Accordingly, the court is without information by which the reliability of
this undisclosed informant could be established other than by reference to other information
in the affidavit.
However, if the search can be sustained on the basis of the defendant's
probationary status, it is not necessary for the court to determine whether or not the search
warrant was properly issued or whether or not it properly authorized the search of "all
persons present during execution of the search warrant". The court, therefore, considers the
issue of whether or not the defendant's probationary status rendered him subject to
warrantless searches by peace officers based upon reasonable suspicion. In concluding that
it does, the court specifically makes the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Defendant was previously convicted of Attempted Burglary, a third degree
felony, in Washington County Criminal No. 951500040 FS, and the court, sua sponte. takes
judicial notice of those prior proceedings.
2. Defendant was sentenced on the Attempted Burglary conviction on March
29, 1995, during which proceeding, the district court specifically stated and included as a
condition of probation that the defendant submit his person, possessions, and residence to
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search at the request of a probation officer at any time and to search by any peace officer
upon reasonable suspicion.
3. The judgment, sentence, and order of probation in that case was not signed
until May 16, 1995. It was entered as part of the court record on May 25, 1995.
4. Pursuant to that judgment, sentence, and order of probation the defendant
signed a standard form Probation Agreement on April 10, 1995, which agreement includes
the following language:
6. SEARCHES: I will permit Agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search
my PERSON, RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property under my
control, without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable
suspicion to ensure compliance with the conditions of my Probation
Agreement.
That agreement also contains the following language which is typed in
as part of paragraph 11 ("SPECIAL CONDmONS"): "D. Submit to
random tests of breath and bodily fluids, and random searches of
person and property."
5. The subject search was conducted by peace officers on April 18, 1995.
6. Probation officers were not involved in conducting the search and did not
request that the search be conducted
7. Even if the circumstances involving Mr. Moore's difficulties with the law are
factored into the equation, the affidavit for the search warrant, a copy of which is attached
hereto, is sufficient to and does establish "reasonable suspicion" on the part of law
enforcement officers to believe that Mr. Hammer, by virtue of his presence on the subject
premises, was in possession of controlled substances, specifically methamphetamine.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court makes upon the following:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The defendant was under the jurisdiction of the Fifth Judicial District Court,
Washington County.
2. The condition of his probation requiring the defendant submit his person
and residence to search by peace officers upon reasonable suspicion is a valid and
enforceable term of the defendant's probation.
3. The defendant was required to submit to the subject search as there was
reasonable suspicion to support the search.
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that
defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence obtained in the search of the defendant's
person is overruled and denied on the basis that the defendant was subject to warrantless
search conducted by peace officers upon reasonable suspicion.
DATED this Z 3 day of \jujt^
J^m^s L.Sh
District Judge
Apj^oved as to form and content
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

STATE OF UTAH,

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF
SEARCH WARRANT

Plaintiff,
vs.
Criminal No.

IN THE MATTER OF A
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
STATE OF UTAH

)

ss.
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)

The Affiapt undersigned, Mike Reynolds, appearing personally
before me and having been sworn, states on oath:
(1)

That I am employed by the St. George City Police

Department as~S law enforcement officer, and I am assigned to
investigate narcotics violations in Washington County.
(2)

The items for which a search warrant is sought are

described as follows:

One 10 inch radial arm saw and stand, and

one 100 foot power cord bank.

Also methamphetamine, and drug

paraphernalia (see exhibit C)•
(3)

These items are believed to be located at or in:

residence located at 1185 North Santa Clara Parkway, Santa Clara,
Utah, including all outbuildings, all vehicles on the premises,
as well as all persons present during execution of the search
warrant.
(4)

The grounds for issuing a search warrant are as

follows:
a.

On April 18, 1995, I received information from Santa

Clara City Marshall Ken Campbell that on April 17, 1995, he

E*#fBIT
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received information from a confidential informant that at about
5:00 that morning, Patrick Sparrow and Eric Fox had stolen a saw
and power cord, and traded them to Ray Adams for an eight ball of
methamphetamine.

The informant stated that he received this

information from one of the individuals involved in the theft.
The informant is a citizen with no motive to fabricate and
nothing to gain from providing this information.
b.

Marshall Campbell was also advised on April 17, by

Robert Loris, that a ten inch radial arm saw and stand, and a 100
foot power cord bank belonging to Mr. Loris had been stolen from
a house Mr. Loris is building at 3520 Chalet Drive, in Santa
Clara.
c.

The informant also advised Marshall Campbeil that he

observed a white pickup truck at the job site early in the
morning on April 17, 1995.
d.

On April 18, 1995, I interviewed Patrick Sparrow, after

first advising him of his Miranda rights.

Mr. Sparrow stated

that he was at 3520 Chalet Drive, in Santa Clara, picking"up
scrap lumber in the early morning hours of April 17, and he
observed the above-described saw.

Mr. Sparrow stated that he was

driving a white pickup truck.
e.

Mr. Sparrow further advised your affiant that the above-

described saw is at the residence of Ray Adams, 1185 North Santa
Clara Parkway, Santa Clara, Utah.
f.

Mr. Sparrow also stated that he used methamphetamine at

Ray Adams1 residence in the early morning hours of April 17.
2
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Mr.

Sparrow stated that he purchased one quarter gram of
methamphetamine from an individual named "Rocky" at the
residence.
g.

Mr. Sparrow stated that "Rocky" is often at the

residence, as well as a female named "Darcy,11 unknown last name,
who Mr. Sparrow believes has been in trouble in the past for drug
use.

Your affiant is aware of individuals by the names of Rocky

and Darcy who are involved in the drug culture in St. George.
h.

In March, 1995, a confidential informant who has proved

to be reliable previously, told your affiant that Ray Adams was
distributing very large quantities of methamphetamine and
marijuana in the Washington County area, and that the informant
had seen methamphetamine in the residence during the month of
March.

The informant also observed individuals at the residence

using methamphetamine.

The informant knew of a large quantity of

methamphetamine that was being delivered to Ray Adams during the
first week of March.
i.

During the last part of February, 1995, your affiant was

contacted by a different confidential informant who advised that
he/she could purchase drugs from Ray Adams, and had purchased
drugs from Ray Adams in the past.

This individual stated that

Ray Adams would drive his vehicle to the Dutchman's Market in
Santa Clara and sell the drugs from his vehicle •
(5) Your affiant has probable cause to believe, and does
believe, that the above-described evidence will be located at or
in the above-described location, and that it could be easily
3
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removed, concealed, damaged or destroyed, and asks for authority
to search without notice.
(6) Your affiant believes the foregoing information
constitutes probable cause to support a search of the garage at
the above residence, and seizure of the above-described evidence,
Dated

tfie-K

Time JZllMCS*
Affiant

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /o

day of April,

1995

DISTRICP^COURT JUDGED

EXHIBIT "fl* &»sr

ITEMS TO SEIZED
SEARCH WARRANT/AFFIDAVIT
CONTINUED

ATTACHMENT

"C"

!•

Methamphetamine, a crystalline white or yellowish
solid or rock form, a controlled substance.

powder

2.

Packaging material,
plastic bags, tape,
foil sections.

3.

Drug paraphernalia to include but not limited to syringes,
bent spoon, cotton balls, mirrors, razor blades, straws,
pipes, glassware
used to produce "crank"
a form of
methamphetamine
and of any cut material or precursor
chemical.

4.

Residency papers to Include, but not limited to utility
receipts and or bills, rental/lease agreements and articles
showing occupancy of the premises on ownership of premises
or automobiles.

5.

U.S. Currency believed to be in close proximity to
narcotics or produced from the sale of narcotics being
searched for.

6.

Narcotic recordation, to include but not limited to price
list, amounts sold, times, dates, amounts purchased, and
especially drug indebtness.

7.

Telephonic equipment to include but not limited to cordless
phones, mobile phones, audio or digital pager devices used
to communicate for the purpose of a related unlawful
activity.

to include, but not limited to scales,
paper bindles cut into squares or tin
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In the Fifth Judicial District Court of Washington County
State of Utah
Minute Entry
Case No. 951500444 FS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs
1

HAMMER, DAX BRANT,
Defendant,

Judge/Comm'r: JAMES L. SHUMATE
Reporter:
Tape: 950271; 950272
Count: 364-3466; 2261-3384
Clerk: ghm
Date: May 18, 1995

(364)
This matter is before District Judge James L. Shumate on May 18, 1995 at 9:00 a.m.
for suppression hearing. Mr. Eric A Ludlow is the prosecutor for the State and Mr. Gary
W. Pendleton is pro bono defense counsel.
Mr. Pendleton makes a statement in reference to motion to quash the warrant and
evidence as well.
DW#1 Marshal Kenneth Campbell is called, sworn and examined regarding
investigation of a theft, ExD-2 affidavit in support of search warrant, credibility of
informant; informant's drug transaction with Rocky Sand at the Adam's residence.
(412-1572)
The signed and served subpoena for Kelly Moore is discussed as well as his telephone
call to the clerk's office informing that he would not be present as he has separated ribs.
Judge Shumate makes a record in reference to affidavit #1 for the search warrant,
(1160)
Mr. Pendleton makes a statement in reference to calling Mr. Ludlow and reason for
it. Mr. Ludlow proffers that he has had no discussions with Moore regarding leniency. Mr.
Pendleton motions to recess and subpoena Mr. Paul Dame from county attorney's office.
(1581-1780)
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page two

Criminal No. 951500444 FS

Judge Shumate makes statement in reference to judicial notice regarding Hammer's
previous case and waiver of fourth amendment rights to search & seizure, warrant for search
reference to paragraph #3.
DW#2 Mike Reynolds s called, sworn and examined regarding being the affiant in the
search warrant, Moore's motive to be an informant.
(2194-2604)
(2605) Judge Shumate's statement for the record regarding motivation of informant's
and defense counsel states case law.
DW#1 Kenneth Campbell is recalled for clarification of the record regarding whether
Moore had discussion with county attorney on April 18, 1995 and if whether or not special
consideration for being an informant, (negative) rests.
(3149) Mr. Pendleton further argues his position.
Recess is called and court will reconvene at 2:30 p.m.

(3466)

Em BIT "g" 0o»T<

page three

Criminal No. 951500444 FS
Tape: 950272 Count: 2261

Court is back in session all parties are present.
(2280) DW#2 Mike Reynolds retakes the stand and is re-direct
examined in reference to all three of the confidential
informants, execution of the search warrant.
Rests
(2750) The court makes a record in reference to Kelly Moore
having been served with subpoena, there being no appearance for
court today, telephone call to the court. Recess was called this
a.m. and the court authorized issuance of order to show cause at
10:30 a.m. supported by a bench warrant with bail set in the
amount of $1,000.00. Copy given to defense counsel and the
problems with sheriff's department for service of the warrant.
(3133) Mr. Pendleton further argues theory in reference to
waiver of fourth amendment applies to the probation office only
and the validity of the warrant in this case.
The balance of the hearing to suppress is continued and
notice setting shall be sent.
(3384) Recess

Eim&nr /•'£"dour,

IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT - St. George COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE

STATE OF UTAH,

Date:

MAY 26, 1995

vs.

Case No:

951500444

DAX BRANT HAMMER,

Judge:

JAMES L SHUMATE

Clerk:

KLH

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

Tape: 950300

FS

Count: 300

HEARING
This case is before the court for SUPPRESSION HEARING on the
charges of
(1)

POSS OF A C/S

(Second Degree Felony)

Appearing for the State is ERIC A LUDLOW.
present.

The defendant is

Appearing as counsel for the defendant is GARY W PENDLETON.

C-300 Court explained confidential informant is not available today
for testimony.

C-350 Mr. Pendleton put forth factual basis of

confidential informant's credability.

Mr. Pendleton stated that

law enforcement was clearly in possession of evidence which magistrate
should have had in issuing the warrant.

Defense still bears burden

of proof at this time and it does not shift back to the State. C-1000
Mr. Pendleton gave circumstances of theft of saw and involvement of
participants.

C-1585 Mr. Pendleton stated there was no probable cause

to establish basis of issuance of search warrant,

EXHIBIT
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c-2603 Court

Case Number: 951500444 FS
responded with concern about defendant Hammer.
under two different assumptions.

Defendant was searched

Warrant may not have been valid but

was for purpose of searching location and also persons at location.
Because defendant was on probation did police officer have right to
search him independent of the warrant? • C-3265 Court is not inclined
to grant or deny motion to suppress at this time.

Reluctance is due

to difference between this defendant and case quoted by Mr. Pendleton.
Mr. Hammer had a diminished right to privacy through 4th amendment
because of his probationary status.
on probation restrictions.
gray area.

Court needs to see more case law

Confidential informant is definitely in

Defendant is unique case to this court.

Court defended

officers as acting in good faith. Court needs to look at warrant as a whole
and not as bifurcated document. C-3977 Court continued for review hearing on
May 31, 1995 at 1:30 p.m.
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT - St. George COURT
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MINUTE ENTRY - NOTICE

Plaintiff,

Date:

MAY 31, 1995

vs.

Case No:

951500444

DAX BRANT HAMMER,

Judge:

JAMES L SHUMATE

Defendant,

Clerk:

VPF

(Jail)

Tape: 950302

FS

Count: 2721

HEARING
This case is before the court for REVIEW HEARING on the charges
of
(1) POSS OF A C/S

(Second Degree Felony)

Appearing for the State is ERIC A LUDLOW.
present.
(2721)

The defendant is

Appearing as counsel for the defendant is GARY W PENDLETON.

This case is before Judge James L. Shumate for a review hear-

ing having been continued from 05-26-95. Mr. Pendleton submits furthe
case rulings from other states regarding probation agreements and
renews his argument that the search was illegal as the probation
order was not signed by the Court until 05-16-95 and not entered into
the Court record until 05-25-95.
The Court finds that at the time Defendant Hammer was under the verbal
order of the probation agreement and was in the residence at the time
of the search.

The Court does not authorize the search warrant but is

Eww •<8"&>W'

Case Number: 951500444 FS
relying on the verbal probation order.

The Court also finds that

Officer Reynolds had reasonable suspicion that Defendant Hammer was
using drugs and was under the search and seizure rule at the time.
The Court denies the motion to suppress.
The court orders that the defendant be remanded to the custody of
the County Sheriff.
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FILED
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS,
—-ooOoo——
State of Utah,
ORDER
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case NO. 950437-CA
v*
Dax Brant Hammer,
Defendant and Petitioner.

Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Jackson (Lav 6 Motion).
This natter is before the court on a petition for permission
to appeal an interlocutory order.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition is denied.
Dated this 31st day of July, 1995.

JTidith M. Billings, Judge

Normal H* Jackson, pledge

